Third Anglo-Burmese War 1885-1890

Mindon tried to readjust to the thrust of imperialism. He enacted administrative reforms and made Burma more receptive to foreign interests. To offset the British, he entertained envoys from France and sent his own emissaries there. Those moves aroused British suspicions, and Anglo-Burmese relations once again worsened. During the reign of Thibaw (1878-85), the British were willing to ignore Upper Burma and to concentrate on French moves in Laos, Vietnam, and Yunnan.

The ensuing Anglo-French tension was the result not so much of French design as of Burmese initiative. A letter to the French premier from the Hlutdaw (ministerial council) suggesting a bilateral treaty posed a direct threat to British teak monopolies in Lower Burma. Meanwhile, the Hlutdaw fined the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation for underreporting its extractions of teak from Toungoo. That action provoked British forces to strike. The annexation of Upper Burma was announced on Jan. 1, 1886, ending the Konbaung dynasty and Burmese independence. The Third Anglo-Burmese War formally ended before it had even developed, but resistance to British rule continued for another four years.

As the British became increasingly interested in the legendary trade with China through its back door--as well as in the teak, oil, and rubies of northern Myanmar--they waited for a suitable pretext to attack. In 1885 Britain declared war on Myanmar for the third and final time. To meet the criticism of their action that arose in Parliament, the British government gave the excuses that the last independent king of Myanmar, Thibaw (ruled 1878-85), was a tyrant and that he was conspiring to give France greater influence over the country. Neither of these charges seems to have had much foundation.

Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885). Burmese king Thibaw (1858-1916), who favored the French and negotiated with them to build a railroad from Mandalay to the Indian border, openly defied the British by not accepting a British envoy. Thus provoked, the British seized Mandalay and northern Burma, which was annexed to India. Thibaw, deposed, was sent to India, but Burmese guerrilla forces fought British troops for four more years before they were pacified.

Annexation of Upper Burma was not a thing to be undertaken by Lord Randoph Churchill in the easy-going, jaunty way, in which he seems to have announced it. Some warned of an inevitable popular resistance to annexation, desipite all the propoganda about Thibaw's repression; the high cost of maintaining troops in Burma; and the difficulty of administering the various upland areas under Mandalay's nominal sovereignty. Lord Dufferin wavered on the question of Upper Burma's future, placed as he was between his senior officials and the government in London. But on 3 November, he wrote to Sir Charles Bernard, the Chief Commissioner of British Burma. Again, it was a perception of the Burmese state's "unsuitability" as a protectorate which was used to justify direct annexation.

In early November a Burma Field Force of about 10,000 troops was organised into three infantry brigades and placed under the command of Major-General Sir Harry Prendergast. Prendergast, a veteran of the Abyssinian campaign of 1867, came from an old India family, both his father and grandfather having served in the East India Company. London was anxious that the campaign be completed as quickly and bloodlessly as possible.

After that, the army proceeded almost uncontested up the Irrawaddy. On 27 November, as the flotilla approached Sagaing, the British received and accepted the unconditional surrender of the Burmese government. Mandalay was entered at three in the afternoon the following day.

The complete lack of any real Burmese resistance after Minhla was due in part to the speed of the British advance following the declaration of war. Most contemporary British observers believed that given only a few more days preparation, the Burmese would have mounted a much more aggressive defence. Fortifications had also been built at Ava and Sagaing and further passage upriver was about to be blocked through a scuttling of the king's steamers. Mandalay had been built partly with an eye to just such a British attack and the plan was to defend the city at all costs, which Thibaw and his court retired northwards to Shwebo to direct a guerilla resistance. But the Burmese government, by the time the British had defeated the main army under Hlethin Atwinwun, concluded that any hope of further resistance was futile. The Kinwun Mingyi sucessfully counselled Thibaw not to flee north but to agree to all British conditions.

The Kinwun Mingyi and at least some of the ministers also seemed to believe that the worst possible outcome of surrender would be a British occupation of Mandalay and the installation of a rival prince under Calcutta's protection. For the reformists, this was perhaps an acceptable alternative to the status quo. Within the government as well, there appeared to be doubts about the loyalty of the Kinwun Mingyi and his faction to Thibaw and the commander of the Ava fort refused to accept orders from the Myoza of Kyaukmyaung to stand down. Kyaukmyaung, the French-educated diplomat, had arrived by boat to negotiate the final surrencer. The Ava commander demanded a personal telegram signed by the king, and was satisfied only when this arrived. At six the next morning, on the eigth day of the waning moon of Tasaungmon, the first British troops entered the royal city through the Red Gate.

A ceremonial entrance into Mandalay was followed by a tense first night of occupation. Law and order quickly broke down in parts of the city and many European residents fled for their own safety. The next afternoon, Thibaw was told by Colonel Edward Sladen, the former Resident and now political officer attached to the expedition, that he was to leave immediately for India. After a few frantic hours of packing, Thibaw andSupayalat appeared at the top of the steps of their summer palace, his entire government prostrate on the ground before him. Prendergast and Sladen stood nearby and escorted the royal couple first to the waiting carriage, and them to the steamer three miles away.

Even then, policy-makers had yet to decide on the future relationship between Upper Burma and British India.... What genuinely convinced British officials in Burma that a protectorate was not a viable option was... the changing local scene in December. To the new colonial authorities, the weakness of Mandalay's control over the countryside even prior to intervention had become clear. They saw what remained of the Burmese state crumble within these first few weeks of occupation.

An interim attempt was made by Colonel Sladen to govern the country through the Hluttaw. Up until this time it was assumed that whatever the final decision was on the the political status of Upper Burma and the retention of the monarchy, the country would be governed through the existing officials and institutions... By December, however, the disturbed nature of the countryside had pushed most of the military and many civilians towards the view that soliciting the cooperation of the former Mandalay government was a hopeless task.

A British amphibious force of 9000 troops and 2800 native followers, under General H.N.D. Prendergast, moved up the Irrawaddy from Thayetmo in 55 river steamers and barges manned by the Royal Navy (November 14). As the expedition rapidly approached his capital, Ava, Thibaw surrendered (November 27). Britain annexed Burma (January 1, 1886).

In August 1885 a sudden flood of rumors was begun by British merchants at Rangoon who insisted the under secret clauses of the convention [signed January 1885] France had gained four important concessions... The rumors were absolutely false... The British merchants at Rangoon sent frantic cables to the various chambers of commerce in the British Isles, requesting that they sould agitate to pull down Theebaw from his throne. But the British officials in Lower Burma, including the commissioner himself, were skeptical of the rumors.

[Chevalier Adreino] was the head of the British spy ring at Mandalay. He now produced a document purporting to be a copy of a letter written by the French foreign minister, Ferry, at the time the Burmese mission was visiting Paris... In the letter Ferry promised to supply arms to the Burmese king from Tongkin... Even in London the British government was annoyed and played with the idea of making Myingun their candidate for the Burmese throne although he was on French Indian territory. But by that time the French had taken Myingun to Saigon, planning to help him invade Burmese territory from French /260 Indo-China, or even from Siam with the latter's consent...

In the midst of all this excitement the Hluttaw delivered its judgment on the long-standing case involving the Bombay Burma Trading [Company], which had a virtual monopoly of the export of Burmese timber. The court found that the sum of 33,333 pounds was due to the foresters. The Hluttaw ordered the [company] to pay to the royal treasury the sum of 73,333 pounds.

In spite of the opinion of the British officials at Rangoon that the matter could still be settled by negotiation, both the British government in London and the governer-general decided to present an ultimatum to King Theebaw..

The governor-general never expected the king would accept his harsh demands and had ordered that a British expeditionary force be assembled immediately at Thayetmyo. The ultimatum was to expire at midnight on November 10, but a full six days before the appointed date Dufferin received the Burmese reply. However the expeditionary force still stood at Thayetmyo, and at the prow of one of its ships a prince in full regalia was seen surrounded by people dressed as ministers and courtiers. The rumor went up and down the Irrawaddy river the Prince Nyangyan was with the expeditionary force, ready to ascend the throne. To all the commanders of Burmese forts along the river there came secret orders, purporting to be from Kinwun Mingyi and instructing them not to resist the British forces, as they had come in support of Nyaungyan. November 10 arrived, and passed, and still the expeditionary force remained at Thayetmyo, as if it were waiting for Kinwun Mingyi's orders to reach all the river garrisons. In actual fact, Nyaugyan had died at Calcutta a few weeks before, but the British kept the news hidden from the public. On November 17 the expeditionary force finally left Thayetmyo for the frontier, but in the meantime a Burmese official accidentally discovered that the young man on the prow was not a prince at all but a clerk in the British commissioner's office who had been dressed to look like Prince Nyaungyan. The Burmese official now doubted the authenticity of the orders not to resist the British. He sent messages up the river informing the commanders of his discovery, but his information arrived too late.

He himself made a desperate effort from Minhla fort to stop the British advance, but after a fierce battle he was killed and the fort destroyed. The British met with no resistance at all until they reached Ava. A peace mission arrived from Theebaw asking for an armistice, but the British commander demanded an unconditional surrender, to which the king agreed. However, the commander of the Ava fort was training his guns on the approaching British expeditionary force. Theebaw sent an urgent message asking him to refrain, but the commander requested written instructions, insisting that he had been receiving conflicting orders throughout the day. Theebaw sent his orders in writing, and the British ships sailed past Ava to Mandalay, where the troops disembarked and surrounded the golden palace. It was now November 28. The British had won an inglorious victory, and the war had lasted just eleven days.

The following morning the king and the queen held their last audience in the lacquer and gold pavilion in the palace garden, awaiting the arrival of the British commander, General Prendergast.

The British general was courteous but firm, and gave the fallen monarch and his queen exactly forty-five minutes to start on their journey to exile on the western coast of India... the king requested permission... to leave his city in state, riding on an elephant or a palanquin. But Prendergast obviously wanted to humiliate Theebaw; he placed him and his queen in a common box carriage drawn by two bullocks.

The streets were lined with people, many of whom had never seen Theebaw before, because throughout his reign, knowing that he was out of touch and unpopular with the people, he had seldom ventured out into the city... The sight of the tiny, dignified figure, helpless, humiliated, and pale, riding on a common cart surrounded by hundreds of red-coated and bearded giants, won for Theebaw the hearts of his people, which he had never known before... Some of the youths threw stones at the soldiers, but the British general, wanting to avoid a riot, hurried the royal party on until it reached the troop ships at sundown...

The final British-Burmese war was even more of a walkover than the second conflict. Carrying 9000 regular troops, three-fourths of them Indian, and 2800 native auxiliaries aboard 55 river steamers and barges manned by the Royal Navy, General H. Prendergast sailed up the Irrawaddy on November 14, 1885. The 15,000 soldiers of Burmese King Thibaw put up only minimal resistance. Upone the approach of the British to his capital at Ava, Thibaw surrendered on November 27. The conquest was achieved at a cost of only 4 British soliders and about 20 sepoys killed in combat. Burmese battle deaths numbered about 250.

The letter conveying this ultimatum was sent by special steamer to Mandalay on 22nd October, 1885...

King Thibaw arranged that fifty elephants should be assembled at Shwemaga, twelve miles north of Mandalay, so that he might retreat to Shwebo, the home town of the dynasty, whenever it seemed desireable. That was how he proposed to head his armies, and the commanders of the various armies had similar cautious views. The military department of the Government of India had drawn up the whole campaign, not a few years before, and had kept the plan up to date, so that all General (afterwards Sir Harry) Prendergast had to do was to see that lives were saved by prompt attack. The only rapid line of advance was up the river, a distance of about three hundred miles. The river channel could easily have been barred and the steamers held up by obstructions. The Burmese knew this well enough and made preparations to do it, both near the frontier, and at the Ava bend in the river. General Prendergast knew it and determined that they should not, at least, do it in a leisurely was.

The frontier was crossed on the 14th November and the launch i-Kathleen-i, about noon steamed up and captured a king's steamer which had two flats in tow, intended to be sunk. These were quite intelligently prepared. Rows of stout posts, ten feet high and sharpened at the top, /325 were let into the decks, and would have ripped up any flat-bottomed steamer that came upon them. A few shells induced the Burmese crew, who were not even bargees, to jump overboard and swim for shore, and the steamer and the flats were taken down to Thayetmiyo. The rapidity of the advance no doubt flustered the Ava party. They got the length of sinking a steamer crammed with rocks, but they sank it in the wrong place.

The advance went on as steadily and uninterruptedly as was consistent with scouting, and the movements of twenty-four steamers and twenty-three flats and the operations of the three brigades of land troops. The frontier stockades at Nyaungbinmaw and Sinbaugwe accepted a couple of shells as notice to quit and proceeded to do so. The following day, the 17th, there was a brush at Minhla, where the only casualties of the campaign occurred. The real fort, on the left bank of Gwegyaung Kamyo, constructed by the Italian naval officer, Commotto, was evacuated as soon as a party of British infantry which had made a seven-mile turning march through the jungle, made its appearance; but the town of Minhla itself, the garrison of a nondescript sort of erection, called a fort, put up a fight. It was an awkward place to attack with small arm fire and the attackers were Madrassi troops. The Burmese had a supreme contempt for most native soliders, and especially for Madrassis, and the misconduct of these justified it and cost the life of Lieut. R. A. T. Dury and the wounding of Major McNeill and three lieutenants. But the redoubt was taken...

On the 26th November, off Nazu, a small village above Yandabu, where the First Burma War ended, a gilt royal boat, paddled by forty men, came, flying the white flag at the bow... The Kyaukmyaung i-atwinwun-i and the Wetmsut i-wundauk-i... presented a royal letter to General Prendergast and Colonel Sladen, the political officer... In the meantime the fleet steamed on and anchored at Kyauktalon, about seven miles below Ava.

The war boat appeared again with the same two officials. This time they brought a telegram from Thibaw, accepting all the conditions imposed the day before and ordering the commanders in Ava and Sagaing on no account to fire on the British and keep the troops quiet. General Prendergast insisted that the garrisons should surrender their arms. The Ava commander declined to do so without a direct order from the king. He did this because he was higher in rank than either of the emissaries, not because he wanted to fight... The royal command came only just in time. Everything was ready for bombardment and attack. The Ava force were quite aware of it and most of the eight thousand men had disappeared when they were ordered to lay down their arms. Only a matter of five hundred rifles and muskets, mostly muskets, were handed over, and the number in the Commotto-built Sagaing, Thambayadaing and Shwekyetyet forts did not reach that total. All the guns were taken or destroyed and the batteries dismantled.

It was therefore ten o'clock in the morning of the 28th November... that the fleet reached Mandalay...

The sun had set before the prisoners were taken on board the i-Thooreah-i (the Sun), which immediately hauled off and anchored in the stream. The Alaungpaya dynasty had ended...

References

Burma, 322-30; History of Burma, 258-64; Making of Modern Burma, 191-4; Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 416-7; Military History, 942; Dictionary of Wars, 15; Anglo-Burmese Wars; Myanmar.

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