Third Murid War 1837-1859

Controversy surrounding the leadership of the second imam strengthened opposition to the Murids among the traditional religious and political leadership in the eastern Caucasus. The death of Hamzad Bek in 1834 resulted in the elevation of Shamil to lead the Murids as the third imam. Shamil would prove to be a charismatic and capable leader but it would take him several years to secure his leadership, reestablish Murid authority in the region and ultimately challenge Russian dominance in the eastern Caucasus. Russian preoccupation with insurrections in other parts of the empire gifted Shamil the time needed to do so. By the summer of 1836 the Russians had become concerned about Murid power and influence and responded with punitive expeditions in Chechnya and Dagestan. Shamil offered to negotiate in October but Russian terms were unacceptable. More punitive expeditions followed in 1837. A final attempt to negotiate was initiated by the Russian commander, Franz Kluge von Klugenau, who met with Shamil on September 30 and proposed another meeting. Shamil declined further negotiation on October 10, 1837. About the same time, Tsar Nicholas I visited the Caucasus and made the pacification of Chechnya and Dagestan a priority.

Both sides were now set on war but the following year passed without significant fighting. During this time, Shamil encouraged villages to relocate deeper in the forested mountains in order to deny supplies to the Russians and he arranged for the people of villages destroyed by Russians to be sheltered in neighboring villages until they could rebuild. The Russians gathered their forces for a new offensive intended to break Murid resistance while Shamil fortified Akhulgo, inviting an attack. In the spring of 1839, Russian troops began the treacherous march on Akhulgo, defeating Murid forces holding defensive positions along the way and after a costly eighty day siege, Akhulgo fell. Shamil and a few of his followers managed to escape but the defeated proved to be a valuable lesson for the continuation of the Murid holy war. After Akhulgo, Shamil reorganized his forces for guerrilla warfare and refrained from trying to fixed positions against Russian attacks.

During the next five years, Murid raids would prove to be devastatingly effective and Russian casualties increased dramatically even as the number of troops deployed in the eastern Caucasus increased substantially. Russian troops were neither well trained nor well equipped for the guerrilla warfare conducted by the Murids. Another military disaster in 1845, the withdrawal after the punitive expedition to Dargo, resulted in a substantial shift in the Russian approach to the war in Chechnya and Dagestan. Beginning in 1846, Russian forces concentrated on securing and holding strategic territory, while restoring privileges to traditional religious and political leaders to gain their cooperation. Road construction and clear-cutting the surrounding forest were aggressively pursued in order to increase Russian mobility and decrease Murid ambushing. Support for the holy war began to soften by the end of the decade.

Previous Murid successes may have contributed to the decline that followed as Shamil pursued state-building, as well as trappings of state like the formation of regular infantry units based on the European model. An attempt to engage the Russians in conventional battle early in 1851 ended in failure. The relentless Russian effort to permanently secure the lowlands and slowly clear the highlands through deforestation and forced resettlement appeared to be working. When the Crimean War broke in 1853, the Murids gained some military supplies from the British and Ottomans while the Russians assumed a more defensive posture in the Caucasus in order to transfer troops to fight in the great power war. Once the war was over, in 1856, the Russian forces were free to launch a new campaign to defeat the Murids. By this time, the Murids had lost support among the local population and Russian troops advanced with little bloodshed. In the summer of 1859, Shamil and the few hundred remaining Murids were encircled in Gunib. Shamil surrendered on August 25, 1859 (September 6, 1859 on the Gregorian calendar).

Notes

[1] The initiation data chosen here reflects the decision by Shamil to end further negotiation. There are numerous other options. It is worth keeping in mind that tribal raiding and Russian punitive expeditions were among the features of what Baddaley describes as "what counted as peace in those regions" during the entire period since at least 1820 and therefore do not constitute telling start dates.

[2] Correlates of War (CoW) provides an end date of April 24, 1852, after which the battle deaths are claimed to decline below war level. The consensus termination date is surrender at Gunib.

[3] CoW estimates Russian battle deaths at 20,000. Other sources offer similar estimates.

[4] Most sources do not provide any estimate of Murid losses. King suggests their losses were "probably far higher" than the 24,800 he claims as the number of Russians killed.

References

Baddaley, 289-482; Baumann, 1-49; Clodfelter, 365-6; COW530; Dixon and Sarkees, 255-7; King, 73-92.

John F Baddaley. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus. Longmans, Green and Company. 1908.

Robert F Baumann. Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. Leavenworth Papers 20. 1993.

Charles King. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford University Press. 2008.

Category

Intra-State War

Region

Central Asia

Belligerents

Russia, Murids

Dispute

Governance

Initiation Date

October 10, 1837^[1]

Termination Date

September 6, 1859^[2]

Duration

21 yrs, 10 mons, 28 days
(8002 days)

Outcome

Imposed Settlement
(Russian victory)

Fatalities

Total: 45,000
Russians: 20,000^[3]
Murids: 25,000^[4]

Magnitude

4.7