Articles On War

Volume Five

Marshall Plan and Cold War
Karl Andrus

Even before the defeat of Nazi Germany, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers of Great Britain and the United States had been deteriorating. By early 1947, relations between the members of the wartime Grand Alliance were such that they could no longer regard one another as allies in any meaningful sense. Their relationship became characterized by substantial tensions, mitigated only by continuing negotiation. The deterioration of relations within the Grand Alliance led to the undeclared conflict known as the Cold War. From the Soviet perspective, the United States alienated the USSR through a series of provocations, culminating with the Marshall Plan, the final straw that broke the back of Soviet willingness to engage in peaceful cooperation with its former allies.

After the war ended, Stalin demonstrated an interest in continuing cooperation. The Communist International (Cominterm), a Soviet sponsored body for organizing socialist revolutions world wide which Stalin disbanded in 1943, was not resurrected postwar. Keeping with the spirit of wartime agreements, Stalin forced Tito to abandon Greek Communists in their revolution, leading to the inevitable defeat of communism in Greece. Similar abandonment of both the French and Italian Communist parties indicated some willingness to keep the spirit of the wartime alliance alive. Of course, Stalin's unwillingness to carry out "democratic" elections in the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe might be interpreted as evidence to the contrary. Certainly there was outright fear among the leaders of the USSR about what seemed to be expanding American influence throughout Europe while Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe was far from complete. But on a whole there still seemed to be more reason to believe there was an interest in cooperation among the wartime allies.

An air of instability and tension hung over Europe in the immediate postwar period. The growing economic difficulties and slow recovery led to a feeling of hopelessness and despair across Europe by the spring of 1947. Europe seemed poised on the edge of a transition to socialism; even conservative minded Britons had already elected a far left Labour government two years earlier. By May 1947, the US government had all but decided to counter this growing tendency towards what it feared would result in communist revolutions throughout Europe, with an offer render massive economic aid to European countries. Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson made clear the reasons behind the need for American aid to Europe: "It is necessary if we are to preserve our own freedoms and our own democratic institutions... It is necessary for our national security." On June 5th 1947, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall made a speech at Harvard University concerning the instability in Europe and the threat of Soviet-style communism. This speech was the launching point for a set of economic and political measures that became known as the Marshall Plan.

The Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan in summer of 1947 has long been viewed as the turning point towards the development of the Cold War. After the summer of 1947, it was no longer simply differences on individual issues that divided the erstwhile members of the wartime anti-Hitler coalition. But the Soviet rejection of the plan was not merely the implementation of a policy of confrontation with the West, rather it was a backlash against what was perceived as an American attempt to dominate the postwar world with economic aid and undermine the security of the USSR. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Nikolai V. Novikov, emphasized the underlying political aspects of the Marshall Plan in a telegram to Soviet Foreign Ministry Molotov on June 24th: "...it is directed toward the establishment of a West European bloc as an instrument of American policy..." Soviet officials felt the United States was exploiting Europe's difficulties, that American imperialists wanted gain control over the economies of those countries that participated in the Marshall Plan and they publicly warned that those who participated in the program would lose control of not only their economies, but also over their political sovereignty.

In view of the situation, the Soviet leadership sought to prevent the United States from obtaining any economic or political advantages through the implementation of the Marshall Plan. Any spirit of cooperation the Soviets had towards their former allies was quickly abandoned in the wake of historical events. The Marshall Plan was the final straw in the destruction of cooperation in the peace that followed the end the World War II so far as Soviet leaders were concerned. Stalin himself no longer trusted his former allies. The Soviet Union entrenched itself within the territories occupied during the war, viewing growing American support for Germany as further evidence of a world united against them. Old enemies became new allies and old allies the new enemies. The Cold War had begun.