Commentaries on War and International Relations
German Command and Control: OKW versus OKH
Ralph Zuljan
One of the most important weaknesses inherent in the armed forces of the Third Reich lay in the peculiar military command structure that evolved during the course of the war. At its pinnacle from the beginning was Adolf Hitler as the Führer or "leader." This in fact was not inconsistent with the relationship of the political leadership and the armed forces found in any of the other great powers. However, the Byzantine organization that developed under Hitler's leadership created the complete lack of strategic direction that became a hallmark of Nazi militarism.
As early as 1938, the military command structure of the Third Reich diverged significantly from that of other great powers. It was in that year that Hitler issued a decree abolishing the Ministry of War and replaced it with a military command -- the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or High Command of the Armed Forces). Its Commander in Chief was Wilhelm Keitel and the Chief of Staff was Alfred Jodl. The OKW was nominally responsible for overseeing the individual military services and ensuring that the requirements of the political leadership were met. In essence, OKW was viewed by Hitler as a military staff responsible for issuing his commands to the individual services.
Each of the traditional services (the army, navy and from 1936 the air force) maintained its own high command throughout the period that the Third Reich existed. These were as follows: OKH (Oberkommando das Heers or High Command of the Army); OKM (Oberkommando das Kriegsmarine or High Command of the Navy); OKL (Oberkommando das Luftwaffe or High Command of the Air Force).
In the case of OKL, the commander in chief was nominally a political appointee as Hermann Göring was first and foremost a Nazi party official and only secondarily the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. Göring's interest in air power and his advocacy of an independent air force originated in his experience as a fighter pilot during the Great War and were instrumental in the formation of the Luftwaffe. Göring remained commander in chief from its inception in 1936 to its demise in 1945. For the most part, the Luftwaffe thrived because it had such a politically powerful patron as its leader.
Of course, like Hitler, Göring held numerous offices and had responsibilities that were far greater than those of the Comander in Chief of the OKL. In practice, Göring was uninvolved in the day to day operation of the Luftwaffe. The responsibility for actually commanding the Luftwaffe fell on Göring's deputy and the OKL Chief of Staff. These positions were occupied by career officers and the individuals concerned were generally considered to have done their jobs well.
The OKM was probably the least politically penetrated of the three traditional services throughout the Nazi period. Its commanders in chief were career naval officers. Admiral Raeder held the post up to 1943 and has usually been credited with the creation of the German Navy that fought during the Second World War. He was replaced by Admiral Dönitz in 1943 as a result of disputes with Hitler. However, since Dönitz was a submariner, his appointment as Commander in Chief of the Navy also reflected the realities of the German experience of naval warfare. Both Raeder and Dönitz were capable naval officers. Ultimately, Dönitz was appointed as Hitler's political heir -- shortly before the latter's suicide in 1945 -- which reflected Hitler's confidence in the navy leadership.
In stark contrast to the patronized Luftwaffe, and the apolitical professionalism of the Kriegsmarine, was the situation of the Army. Befitting the geographic position of the Third Reich, the Army was, by far, the largest military service. It was also the historically recognized senior service of the armed forces and it remained, throughout the Nazi period, an organization dominated by traditional and aristocratic officers. Any opposition to Hitler's rule worth mentioning originated in (or was substantially supported by) the army. Conversely, Hitler's rule of the Third Reich before the outbreak of war depended on the tacit support, or at least acquiescence, of the army.
There were numerous political intrigues involving Hitler and the army during the prewar period which reflected the strained relationship. Hitler, for example, took an active part in securing the appointment of the pliable Walter von Brauchitsch to the position of Commander in Chief of the OKH in 1938 -- a position Brauchitsch continued to hold until illness forced his resignation in December 1941. Hitler achieved this through the dissemination of false accusations of homosexuality against Werner von Fritsch, the previous commander in chief (who was widely regarded as willing and capable of "standing up" to Hitler). Likewise, Franz Halder became the Chief of Staff of the OKH in 1938 because Ludwig Beck resigned in protest over Hitler's designs on Czechoslovakia. (Beck would ultimately choose to commit suicide in July 1944 as a result of his involvement in the plot to overthrow Hitler.) Halder, who was never favorably disposed towards Hitler, remained the Chief of Staff until September 1942 nonetheless. (He would ultimately be arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 for his knowledge of the various army plots to overthrow Hitler.) There is no doubt Hitler understood the precarious relationship he had with the German army on the eve of war in 1939.
The litany of OKH opposition to Hitler's plans included the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the anschluss with Austria, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, the invasion of France and the invasion of the Soviet Union. Essentially, if Hitler had a plan that involved military action he could count on the OKH to counsel against it. There can be no better testament to the political power of the German army at the start of World War II than the fact that Hitler tolerated its constant opposition and subversion of his political will. None of the other great powers brooked military commanders who demonstrated such insolence towards the political leadership. It is small wonder that Hitler took every opportunity to reign in the OKH.
On the eve of war in 1939, the OKH remained beyond Adolf Hitler's control. Even with the meek Brauchitsch as Commander in Chief, the traditional independence of the Army generals proved to be impossible to overcome and lengthy arguments over policy and strategy were inevitable to bring about Army compliance. The presumptuous Army generals infuriated Hitler and corporal Hitler's meddling in their business irritated the generals. This frustrating relationship probably caused the generals to toy with a coup and it led Hitler to search for ways to circumvent the OKH. He found a willing alternative in OKW.
OKW was nominally a superior headquarters to OKH but its staff lacked the capability to conduct military operations without support from the independent services. Since its inception in 1938 OKW found itself relegated to irrelevance due to the lack of cooperation from the service branches in realizing its conception of a unified armed forces headquarters. As each of the service chiefs had direct access to Hitler, OKW did not have the capability to assert authority without Hitler's immediate support. This, however proved to be a useful relationship in OKW's particular bureaucratic struggle with OKH.
OKW was the only military headquarters in the Third Reich that had a vested interest in obeying Hitler's orders and Hitler probably recognized in it a potentially useful rival to the independent-minded OKH. By 1940 Hitler used OKW to plan and execute a military operation, the invasion of Norway. This initial effort at circumventing the OKH proved successful enough to form the basis of similar ad hoc arrangements in Finland and North Africa in 1941. The OKW capability to provide an alternative command structure, comparable to OKH, grew with these experiences. The OKH, however, remained substantially more capable of conducting military operations.
Hitler increasingly asserted his claim, as Führer of the Third Reich, to expect obedience from the Army of the Third Reich as the war progressed. During the campaigns against Poland and France this had been relatively benign. However, the campaign against the Soviet Union produced a serious clash between Hitler and OKH. The conflicting visions of the conduct of Operation Barbarossa initially led to a crisis after the conclusion of the Battle of Smolensk: Hitler sought to divert forces from the Moscow axis for an envelopment of the southern flank; the senior generals favored an immediate continuation of the advance to Moscow. The ensuing arguments dragged on for about one month before the Army acquiesced. Ultimately, as the advance on Moscow faltered and a Soviet counteroffensive ensued in December 1941, an even more serious crisis developed. It was at this point that Brauchitsch suffered his heart attack and was forced to resign and Hitler took over as Commander in Chief of the German Army.
Although much has been been written about this move, there was a precedent in the organization of the armed forces of the Third Reich. Göring, after all, had been Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe since 1936 and Hitler's direct command of the Army could be seen as the patronizing of the Army by the Führer himself. In terms of the politics of Nazi Germany, it is likely that Hitler viewed his direct command of the Army as a useful counterbalance to Göring's command of the Luftwaffe. Of course, it was also a victory for Hitler in the struggle to gain some measure of control over OKH. It proved to be a disappointing victory. Although he nominally achieved direct command, opposition within the Army leadership remained and its focal point merely shifted to the Chief of Staff. With Hitler's ascension to Commander in Chief of the Army, the Chief of Staff became the representative of the Army point-of-view.
The pressure of being Chief of Staff of the Army was enormous. Franz Halder filled the post until September 1942 at which time Kurt Zeitzler replaced him. Zeitzler held on until July 1944 when he collapsed from the strain and Heinz Guderian took over. He resigned in March 1945 after a violent argument with Hitler and was replaced by Krebs. With the exception of Krebs, each of these individuals ended up in bitter confrontations with Hitler over issues of strategic direction and control of the Army. Unlike Göring, Hitler took an active role in command.
From a strictly formal perspective, Hitler's status as Führer and Commander in Chief of the Army put the OKW in an untenable position with respect to its relationship to the Army. Commands issued to OKW by Hitler as Führer were ostensibly issued by OKW to Hitler as Commander in Chief of the Army. In practice, the authority structure rapidly devolved into one in which OKH under the leadership of the Chief of Staff became responsible for conducting the war on the Eastern Front while OKW under its Commander in Chief was responsible for conducting the war on all other fronts (including Norway, Finland, North Africa and eventually the Balkans, Italy and western Europe). This division of responsibilities was formally accepted during 1942. However, a great deal of bureaucratic infighting continued as a result of the confused relationship between OKW and OKH.
The division of authority that resulted from having what were in effect two competing Army High Commands gave Hitler a good basis for dominating the Army command system. This encouraged field commanders to develop bilateral relations with Hitler, further weakening the chain-of-command. Furthermore, by isolating the theaters of operations, individual generals were incapable of understanding the overall military situation; only Hitler was positioned to have a comprehension of the correlation of forces on the whole. This prevented the possibility of a military dictatorship developing in the Third Reich (as had developed in Germany during the First World War) but it also made the rationalization of force distribution wholly dependent on the ability of a single individual, Hitler, to develop a correct appreciation of the overall situation -- usually based on reports provided by military commanders who were courting Hitler's favor for their own sphere of influence.
Originally published in "World War II" at Suite101.com in two parts on February 1, 2000 and March 1, 2000. Revised edition published in "Articles On War" at OnWar.com in two parts on July 1, 2003.
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